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Background: Opioids are a high-risk medicine used in high doses and volumes in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services to manage palliative patients’ pain and other symptoms. 
Despite the high volume of opioid use in this care setting, serious errors with opioids are 
exceedingly rare. However, little is known about the factors that mitigate opioid errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
Aim: To explore palliative care clinicians’ perceptions of factors that mitigate opioid errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
Methods:  
Design: A qualitative study using focus groups and semi-structured interviews.  
Participants and setting: Registered nurses, doctors, and/or pharmacists (‘clinicians’) who 
were involved with and/or had oversight of the services’ opioid delivery and/or opioid quality 
and safety processes, employed by one of three specialist palliative care inpatient services 
in metropolitan NSW. 
Findings: Fifty-eight participants took part in this study, three-quarters (76%) of which were 
palliative care nurses. A positive opioid safety culture was central to mitigating opioid errors 
in specialist palliative care inpatient services. This culture of opioid safety was founded on 
clear and consistent safety messages from leadership, clinicians empowered to work 
together and practise safely, and a non-punitive approach to errors when they occurred. The 
clinical nurse educator was seen as pivotal to shaping, driving and reinforcing safe opioid 
delivery practices across the palliative care service. 
Conclusion: Creating and sustaining a positive opioid safety culture, and promoting a non-
punitive approach to opioid error and reporting, is essential to mitigating opioid errors in the 
specialist palliative care inpatient setting. 
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Summary of Relevance 
Problem: Opioids are a high-risk medicine with the potential to cause serious patient harm 
when errors in delivery occur.  
What is already known: Opioids are used in high volumes and doses in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services yet serious patient harm in this setting is exceedingly rare.  
What this paper adds: This is the first paper to explore opioid error mitigating factors in the 
specialist palliative care inpatient setting. This study identified that a positive opioid safety 
culture, and opioid education tailored to the palliative care context, is central to supporting 








Patient safety underpins high quality care across all healthcare settings (Institute of 
Medicine, 2000). Palliative care patients’ fragility, comorbidities, significant symptom burden, 
and the need for input from multiple healthcare providers, places them at greater risk of 
exposure to and harm from medical error (Dy, 2016; Myers & Lynn, 2001). Medical error at 
the end-of-life can impede treatment goals and the provision of comfort measures, 
considerably adding to the distress and suffering of patients and their caregivers (Casarett, 
Spence, Clark, Shield, & Teno, 2012; Dy, 2016). Hence, there is a growing focus on patient 
safety within specialist palliative care (Casarett et al., 2012; Dietz, Borasio, Schneider, & 
Jox, 2010).  
The burden of pain experienced by palliative patients can be considerable, as such, the 
timely and effective treatment of pain is a palliative patient safety priority (Dy, 2016; Shekelle 
et al., 2013). Opioids are routinely used in palliative care services for the management of 
pain and other symptoms (Australian Adult Cancer Pain Management Guideline Working 
Party, 2014; Therapeutic Guidelines Limited, 2016). These high-risk medicines, have a 
heightened risk of causing patient harm, injury or death when errors in opioid delivery occur 
(Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2012), and are the most frequently reported drug 
class causing patient harm (Clinical Excellence Commission NSW Health, 2018; Dy, Shore, 
Hicks, & Morlock, 2007). As a result, specific strategies targeting safe opioid delivery are 
widely employed in the health care setting (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care, 2018; Colquhoun, Koczmara, & Greenall, 2006; Institute for Safe Medication 
Practices, 2018), many of which are reflected in mandated medication handling policies 
(Ministry of Health NSW, 2013, 2015). 
Compared to other healthcare settings, opioid delivery for the vast majority of palliative care 
patients includes: multiple opioid orders and formulations, including regular and as needed 
(‘PRN’) orders, often administered via different routes (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & 
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Phillips, 2019). There is a higher frequency of opioid delivery in inpatient palliative care 
services than in the acute care setting, with considerably higher opioid doses also used 
compared to all other healthcare settings (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018; 
Heneka et al., 2019).  
Despite the high frequency and high doses of opioids used in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services, serious patient harm due to medication errors with opioids is exceedingly 
rare (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018a). Additionally, palliative care 
clinicians perceive the prevalence of opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services to be low, given the high frequency of opioid delivery in this setting. While factors 
contributing to opioid errors in inpatient palliative care services are becoming better 
understood (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018b; Heneka et al., 2019), little is 
known about the factors that mitigate opioid errors in these services. Identifying opioid error 
mitigating factors is essential to better understand how to foster and support safe opioid 
delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services.  
Aim 
To explore palliative care clinicians’ perceptions of factors that mitigate opioid errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
Methods 
Design  
A qualitative study using focus group and semi-structured interviews.  
Participants 
Registered nurses, doctors, and/or pharmacists (‘clinicians’) employed by a specialist 
palliative care inpatient service, who are involved with and/or have oversight of the services’ 




Three inpatient palliative care services in metropolitan New South Wales: two 40-bed 
palliative care units; and a 20-bed unit.  
Ethical approval 
This study was approved by the St Vincent’s Hospital Human Research Ethics Committee 
(LNRSSA/16/SVH/321) on December 7, 2016. 
Recruitment and data collection  
Details of recruitment and data collection have been reported in detail elsewhere (Heneka et 
al., 2019). All participants provided informed, written consent. A question guide informed by 
the literature (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, & Phillips, 2015) and piloted with palliative care 
service managers and medication safety experts, guided the focus groups and semi-
structured interviews (Table 1).  
[Insert Table 1] 
Data analysis  
Inductive thematic data analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was employed for this study. Initial 
data coding was guided by the focus group/semi-structured interview questions, with codes 
and collated data examined for potential themes. To ensure rigour, the preliminary themes 
were identified independently (NH and JLP) and refined through collaborative analysis until 
the final themes and sub-themes were confirmed. All transcriptions were read in conjunction 
with the original audio recording (NH) to check for accuracy. Data familiarisation was 
achieved through multiple readings of the transcripts and field notes (NH). The procedures 
used to ensure trustworthiness of the data findings have been reported elsewhere (Heneka 
et al., 2019). The Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research (COREQ) has 




Fifty-eight clinicians participated in this study, comprising nurses (n=44, 76%), physicians 
(n=12, 21%) and pharmacists (n=2, 3%). Participant demographics and details of focus 
groups/semi-structured interviews have been previously reported (Heneka et al., 2019).  
Clinicians’ perceptions of factors that support safe opioid delivery in inpatient palliative care 
services are described in four primary themes and six subthemes as summarised in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 Participant key: CNE: Clinical Nurse Educator: NUM: Nurse Unit Manager: RN: Registered 
Nurse. 
A positive safety culture underpins safe opioid delivery  
Participants overwhelmingly described the existence of a positive opioid safety culture in 
their services, which they perceived to be fundamental to preventing opioid errors and 
supporting safe opioid delivery. Opioid safety culture was linked to four central factors: i) 
clearly communicated and consistent expectations from management regarding safe opioid 
delivery; ii) a culture of empowering clinicians to practice safely; iii) interdisciplinary 
teamwork; and, iv) establishing and promoting a non-punitive error reporting culture. 
Clear expectations regarding safe opioid delivery 
For unit managers, acknowledging the high volume use of high-risk opioids, and privileging 
the importance of consistent, safe, opioid delivery, underpinned the services’ approach to 
opioid safety: 
We've said that because we do so many (opioids) instead of expecting 
that we would, as a result of that, have a high rate (of errors), we've 
said…we should be experts at it and we should be the best at it. Which is 
another change in cultural focus. I think we've continued to raise the 
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profile in suggesting that it's (opioid delivery) a really pivotal part of what 
we do. I think it's that culture of, ‘this is important’ (ID33_NUM).  
Participants reflected on the importance of ‘a top down approach’, with management taking a 
lead role to promote awareness of opioid delivery policies, and consistently communicating 
and enforcing their expectations regarding safe opioid delivery. Participants also noted that 
the consistent messages from management regarding how opioid delivery policy was 
implemented, was vital to upholding safe opioid practices within the unit: 
For me [the safety culture] is from the top down, definitely management 
has a huge influence on the culture…everyone is aware of what is going 
on and wants to be sure that the right thing is being done…(it’s) all 
consistent, that's what I've noticed, everybody does it the same; it's not 
just one person that does it this way, everyone is doing it the same, that's 
what I think is great (ID47_RN). 
The ever-present risk and potential consequences of an error during opioid preparation was 
readily identified by participants. Participants stressed that, fundamental to safe opioid 
delivery, was the importance of respecting both the opioids, and the opioid delivery process 
itself:  
We missed a drug when we were making up (an infusion pump), and 
there was a thousand things that happened that day, but it just made me 
realise that…when we do these breakthroughs, and we're dealing with 
the (opioids) that this is really important - actually, we're not going to talk 
right now because I'm doing a pump; and sometimes I think…that we 
deal with such huge doses that sometimes you get a bit blasé with the 
doses that you're dealing with, and it was a really good reminder for 
me…make sure you're focused on only giving the drugs…give these 
drugs the respect they deserve (ID37_RN). 
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It was acknowledged that a positive safety culture required a multi-faceted approach 
encompassing situational awareness, vigilance and a non-punitive, organisation wide 
commitment to upholding safety culture:  
It's that combination of alertness, awareness, everyone being aware of 
inexperience, and an open, blame-free culture (ID09_Physician). 
Empowering clinicians to practise safely 
Participants reflected on the positive impact of a culture that empowered and reinforced the 
need to practise safely in accordance with each clinician’s professional responsibilities, 
especially when dealing with opioids. These participants recognised that opioid errors 
harmed the patient and the clinician:  
Preventing the errors is a safeguard for us as well as the patient…it's a 
safeguard for our professional registrations as well; if you're a registered 
nurse, it's just part of your professional responsibility to make sure that 
you maintain your standards (ID43_RN). 
Mandated policies for opioid handling/management were seen as very effective in reducing 
opioid errors when policies were strictly adhered to: 
We're very strict…and again, it's just policy. We've had a lot of new staff 
start over the last year or two, and I think because they've come into that 
culture as existing, with all the strictness around doing things the right 
way (following policy)...that's the funny thing, we're just doing it the right 
way, it's not like we're re-inventing the wheel (ID35_NUM).   
Adherence to opioid delivery policies was perceived to be strengthened by a service culture 
that supported clinicians to challenge each other if policy non-compliance was identified:  
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I think we've empowered our staff to feel comfortable in doing things the 
right way, and challenging people if they don't want to do it the right 
way…at the end of the day, you're responsible for your registration…if 
something goes wrong and you're in a court of law, nobody's actually 
going to back you when (you didn’t follow) policy (ID34_CNE). 
Participants consistently acknowledged the power of a positive service culture that created 
an expectation of opioid adherence to ensure safe opioid delivery. This positive culture 
enabled them to feel confident, safe and supported, to challenge any perceived or actual 
opioid policy breaches, and for many this was in stark contrast to their previous experiences:  
I came from a culture where it was like…why would two people go to a 
bedside? But here, really promotes that...I'm very confident now in saying 
‘you actually need to come with me’…because really, the culture now is 
that you just don't do that, and I've never been in a unit before where it's 
been like that (ID37_RN). 
Participants noted and reflected on the differences between palliative care and other 
services, in relation to opioid safety, noting that the expectations and enforcing of 
independent double checking standards were much higher in the palliative care service 
compared to units they had previously worked: 
I've never worked anywhere that's been so thorough checking their 
(opioids) (ID48_RN);  
No, neither have I, and I've got 30 years nursing experience. It's keeping 
me safe and the patients safe, and that's what I like about it (ID42_RN). 
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Working as a team 
Effective inter-disciplinary team work was central to opioid safety and contributed positively 
to safety culture. The complexity of opioid prescribing and administration meant that 
participants relied on, and expected, that their interdisciplinary colleagues worked diligently 
to ensure all opioid orders/administrations were correct, or were open to being challenged. 
Participating physicians stressed that, from the medical perspective, inter-disciplinary team 
work in palliative care was essential to ‘enable the nurses to do their job’ (ID51_Physician). 
They described actively encouraging nurses to question orders they felt were incorrect: ‘…if 
it’s wrong, I’m happy to be questioned’ (ID55_Physician); and all physicians noted they 
routinely consulted with nurses to check opioid orders:  
When I'm calculating something, if it's particularly complex or warrants 
double checks I often ask one of the nurses, what do you think?’ 
(ID56_Physician). 
Similarly, nurse participants described how they were confident querying opioid orders they 
perceived to be incorrect, or initiating discussions about changes to patients’ opioid orders:  
So I said to the doctor, are you sure this is what you want? I think the 
intention was (for administration) today, but they re-charted it for 
tomorrow morning…they're human too…if we see something, we 
question it. I think we're spoiled here, that we do have a good relationship 
with our doctors (ID48_ RN). 
Participants from services with full-time palliative care pharmacists greatly valued and noted 
the high level of interdisciplinary collaboration their presence afforded, particularly in regards 
to opioid management:  
We're really fortunate that we have pharmacists on site, they're very open 
to anybody spending time with them, clarifying anything, if the doctors are 
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not here and the nurses are uncertain about why the breakthrough dose 
is such as it is (ID34_ CNE).  
From the pharmacist’s perspective, an important outcome of the tasks they routinely 
undertook, such as opioid order review, management of opioid supply, and targeted opioid 
education, was a reduction in workload, particularly for palliative care nurses:   
A lot of what we do…also helps the nursing staff, it reduces the workload, 
to me that's very important to assist them (nurses) in that way, reducing 
their workload, (as) they have plenty to do (ID40_Pharmacist). 
Promoting a non-punitive approach to error  
Creating and promoting a non-punitive error reporting-culture was a key strategy each 
service had adopted to support opioid safety. Error-reporting was seen as an opportunity to 
improve individual and unit performance, and also critically assess and identify potential 
systems failures that may be contributing to error: 
We work in a unit where we certainly want to identify errors, but we don't 
want to take a punitive approach to the error…it's not about dragging that 
person over the coals, it's very much about improving performance, 
improving patient safety and then looking at the system and saying ‘is 
there something more than just talking to the individual about what we're 
going to do here?’ (ID32_Physician).  
It was also acknowledged that a punitive reporting culture has a negative impact on, and 
was counter-productive to, a positive safety culture:  
I think there have been some times when it was a bit more punitive than 
supportive if you know what I mean, and it always had a negative effect 
on the culture (ID16_Physician). 
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Transforming a punitive culture into a positive reporting culture was noted by multiple 
participants to require significant and sustained effort. Participants, especially those in 
leadership or management roles, described the steps they had taken to transform the error 
reporting culture over time. This extended to reinforcing the importance of opioid error 
reporting, and supporting clinicians to identify and report errors: 
…creating a safe reporting culture…and having a safe conversation 
together, so me making them feel safer, less vulnerable professionally 
over a period of time didn't come easy, but over time, I think it’s pretty 
much going okay now (ID57_ NUM). 
Ultimately, participants perceived that having a positive safety culture within their services, 
promoted a culture of error reporting:  
I don't think we have a culture where we're frightened to report anything. I 
don't think we have a culture where we're afraid to own up to any 
mistakes… I think we're all accepting of each other, and if a mistake is 
made, you have to do something about it, and I don't think there's a 
culture of shielding that (mistakes) from management (ID47_RN). 
Opioid error reporting is encouraged and expected  
Participants perceived that opioid errors, on the whole, were quite accurately and routinely 
reported, compared to other medications:  
…with opioids, it's more serious, we have to do a report…I'm pretty sure 
that all opioid errors would be reported (ID18_RN).  
This was perceived in part, to be related to palliative patients’ needs, whereby their 
medication orders are routinely reviewed by multiple clinicians over the course of the day:  
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There's enough eyes looking at the medication chart over a period of 24 
hours to think that we are, hopefully, reporting them all (ID16_Physician).  
Participants also suggested that the mandated 24 hourly checks of the drug book helped 
identify opioid administration errors, which were subsequently reported: 
If it’s not the person making the mistake reporting it, someone else will; 
the next shift might pick up a mistake, they might see something in the 
drug book doesn’t correlate and they’ll report it; or they’ll tell our manager 
and the manager will report it (ID14_ RN). 
While the overwhelming majority of participants perceived that the unit had a positive and 
supportive error reporting culture, a very small number of participants described how they 
were sometimes reluctant to report an opioid error as they did not perceive the reporting 
culture in their service to be non-punitive:  
…the problem I think with reporting is it becomes a bit of a blame 
thing…once it’s reported…it seems like someone also has to have the 
blame (ID08 _RN). 
Despite this reluctance, error reporting culture was considered a key element of opioid 
safety, with participants suggesting that reporting more errors did not necessarily reflect poor 
practice, but rather a positive safety culture:  
I've certainly seen that elsewhere…that it reflects badly on the unit, the 
more incidents you have. It doesn't look good, so you're not encouraged 
to (report) in other places, but they do encourage it here, to help highlight 
the issues so that we can rectify (ID25_ RN). 
 
 15 
Rectify or report? 
Mandated policies related to opioid management, such as independent second person 
checks prior to administration, were perceived to routinely intercept potential errors:  
…our safety checks pick up a lot of those (opioid) errors before they 
actually happen (ID09_Physician).  
In contrast to opioid administration errors, participants suggested that not all opioid 
prescribing errors were reported. This was primarily because nurses in particular, were more 
likely to try to rectify prescribing errors first, and, if the error was promptly rectified, were 
unlikely to report the error:  
Generally if I find a prescribing problem you just go and get (the doctor) 
to fix it, you don't put a report in (ID18_ RN).  
Participants suggested that prescribing errors were readily fixable, and timely administration 
of the correct opioid order, and effective pain management, was the priority for this patient 
population: 
I think often you can rectify the problem quite simply…you go to the 
doctor to change it, so, rather than report it, it's quicker just to fix it; I think 
we don't report it because it's fixable…we report falls and pressure areas 
because we can't fix them on the spot but if it's a medication error we just 
go and get the chart fixed, and it's done (ID45_ RN). 
Participants perceived that errors intercepted during the mandated two-person check, and 
before reaching the patient (‘near misses’), are rarely reported, re-iterating the purpose of 
the independent double check for minimising opioid errors:  
If you went to give it (opioid) and one of you decided ‘oh that’s the wrong 
patient’, that would be rectified, that’s why you’ve got two people, and I 
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don’t know that that would be…that may happen, and it wouldn’t ever be 
reported (ID06_ RN). 
The exceptions were: i) incidents which resulted in a narcotic discrepancy (e.g., wrong opioid 
drawn into syringe and/or opioid discarded), which were promptly reported; and ii) incidents 
where clinicians were: ‘not happy to give (the medication)’ (ID04_RN) after identifying an 
error, for example, an opioid order is wrong, or a wrong drug has been taken to the bedside:  
If your double checking identifies something before you’ve drawn it all up 
and are going to give it then you’ve prevented it from being a problem, 
but I guess if someone’s actually willing to go and take it to the patient, 
and there’s the potential it would have been given without resistance, that 
would be reported (ID05_RN). 
Reflecting and learning from error 
For the majority of participants, error reporting was seen as an opportunity for the clinician 
involved to reflect on practice, and the service to identify potential systems deficits:  
If someone identifies that they missed something and they report it, then 
you're reflecting on your own practice…I think you’re going to be much 
more vigilant, just from reporting it. Then the (service) follow through also 
happens. It's viewed in a constructive rather than a punitive fashion…but 
we do want vigilance around it (ID32_Physician).  
Participants stressed ‘we're not blasé about mistakes, everyone takes it really seriously’ 
(ID38_RN); and several participants reflected on their own experiences with opioid errors at 
a personal and professional practice level. Participants who shared examples of opioid 
errors they had made universally described great distress and spoke of how the experience 
had strengthened their commitment to the required safety processes: 
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I think those of us, personally speaking, who have made a drug error with 
an opioid, then you know you never ever do it again. It was scary at the 
time. I thought, "Oh my God, I think I'm having a heart attack" but 
everyone was okay. It was fine. The patient was okay. The family was 
okay. At the time, I was like, "I think I'm going to die." But you never do it 
again. You triple check. You quadruple check (ID61_RN). 
Participants also shared how they had self-reported opioid errors and reflected on how their 
practice changed following an opioid error: 
I’ve reported myself on an (opioid) error that I’ve made and…I was 
mortified by the error, it just changed my practice…I’ve never felt that 
somebody from above has come down on me in a punitive way, and I 
have changed or bettered my own practice because I’ve been so upset 
that I’ve made an error that I’m fairly sure I would not do that again 
(ID06_RN).  
Education is empowering  
Participants highlighted the importance of education targeting opioid use in the palliative 
care context as a strategy to reduce error. While each clinician was responsible for adhering 
to opioid practices, investing in the clinical nurse educator (‘CNE’) role was seen as pivotal 
to instilling and reinforcing safe opioid practices: 
I think (the CNE) has played a really big role in…giving nurses a really 
good base for practicing safely. They realise and understand that they're 
responsible and they're at risk if they don't follow those basic rules…I 
think (they’re) empowered to be able to understand that by practicing 
safely they are also protecting themselves (ID41_Pharmacist).  
 
 18 
All services provided a comprehensive orientation program for new clinical staff with a 
substantial focus on opioids. New palliative care nurses routinely spent one-on-one time with 
the clinical nurse educator to familiarise themselves with the intricacies of opioid 
administration as part of orientation:  
When I first started here, [the CNE] was with me for at least a couple of 
days…at first it was like, ‘oh my gosh, I've got so much to learn, I'd better 
pay attention’; that's another sort of safeguard because she went through 
things as an educator, everything was explained at that time – ‘this is how 
we do it’, just so it becomes a part of your everyday practices right from 
the start, that was really good (ID47_RN). 
In addition to investing in opioid education at orientation, each service invested in ongoing 
education, as exemplified in this quote: ‘…there is a lot of education in regards to opioids’ 
(ID20_RN). Participants described both formal (e.g., information sessions conducted by 
pharmacists; weekly tutorials for junior medical officers; one-on-one opioid conversion 
exercises with the clinical nurse educator), and informal education that occurred within the 
day to day operations of the service: 
Informal education, obviously, happens all the time on the consultant 
teaching ward rounds. We usually have a combination of a registrar and 
a resident…if we know that it's a junior registrar combined with an 
inexperienced RMO, the consultants are on high alert, as are the senior 
members of the nursing staff, to be checking that things are okay, and to 
be alert for any possible issues to be reported back, so trying to be open, 
encouraging the junior doctors to know that there's no fear or blame, and 




Ongoing education was also seen as critical to instilling clinician confidence to safely handle 
opioids, challenge any perceived opioid errors, and to respond appropriately to identify 
opioid errors: 
I think nurses are very happy to challenge orders…I think just learning 
about the opioid conversion, learning what that means and why it's 
important (makes them confident to challenge), so being empowered by 
education (ID34_CNE). 
Sustaining an opioid safety culture requires ongoing, targeted attention  
While culture was seen as critical to supporting opioid safety, participants in managerial or 
dedicated patient safety roles spoke of deficits in safety culture in preceding years. 
Participants suggested that clinician’s attitudes towards opioid safety from previous 
management had adversely impacted the opioid safety culture, and error prevalence, in the 
past: 
There had been a culture of under reporting, and people believing that by 
reporting, you are getting your colleague in trouble, or if it didn't harm the 
patient you don't have to report it…unfortunately it was a culture that was 
supported by the (manager) so the staff didn't see anything wrong by 
under reporting…that's the culture that actually permitted more significant 
incidents to actually happen (ID31_RN). 
They also described how creating a positive opioid safety culture had required substantial 
changes to clinicians’ attitudes and clinical practice, and ongoing, pro-active measures to 
sustain it. Clinician complacency was a common barrier each service had to manage when 
looking to improve opioid safety culture initially:  
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We've done a lot of work over two years…I think initially there was a 
complacency (about opioids)…the sheer volume made (clinicians) 
overconfident…people had a sense of corner cutting… (ID57_NUM). 
Another critical part of strengthening the opioid safety culture was the open 
acknowledgement and management of opioid errors: 
That was a big cultural shift…not only looking at processes and trends, 
but also raising the profile of (errors), so making it very important that if 
an error happens that we need to look at that…and talk about (errors) 
very regularly (ID33_NUM). 
Discussion 
Patient safety in palliative care is an emerging and important area of research (Dietz et al., 
2010; Dy, 2016). Given the high volume of opioid use in the palliative care inpatient setting 
(Heneka et al., 2019), identifying opioid error mitigating factors in the palliative care context 
is timely. This qualitative study identified that a positive opioid safety culture is critical to 
instilling and supporting palliative care clinicians’ adherence to safe opioid delivery practices, 
and central to mitigating opioid errors.  
For the palliative care clinicians in this study, opioid safety culture was predicated on clear 
and consistent expectations from leadership, clinicians empowered to work together and 
practise safely, and a non-punitive approach to errors when they occur. The clinicians in this 
study illustrated that a positive safety culture is created when there are shared values, 
attitudes, competencies and behaviours that reflect the palliative care services’ commitment 
to safe opioid delivery (Nieva & Sorra, 2003). These factors were perceived to be critical to 
instilling and supporting palliative care clinicians’ adherence to safe opioid delivery practices, 
and central to reducing opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services. This is an 
important finding as it is widely accepted that a positive safety culture is fundamental to 
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reducing or preventing errors in any healthcare setting (Hodgen, Ellis, Churruca, & 
Bierbaum, 2017; Institute of Medicine, 2000).  
Safety culture has long been believed to be a predictor of an organisation’s safety 
performance (Wakefield, McLaws, Whitby, & Patton, 2010). In a positive safety culture it is 
recognised that errors are inevitable, and the organisation works proactively to identify 
factors that promote error causing conditions and seeks to rectify them (Nieva & Sorra, 
2003; Reason, 2008). In this study, opioid safety was prioritised by unit and patient safety 
managers who acknowledged the risk involved in opioid delivery, and privileged safe opioid 
delivery as a fundamental component of quality palliative care service provision. This was 
reflected in the discussion with frontline clinicians, who reported a high level awareness of 
opioid safety expectations from management, and felt compelled and supported to adhere to 
the policies for safe opioid prescribing and administration. When opioid errors did occur, a 
non-punitive error reporting culture promoted reporting, and supported clinicians to reflect 
and learn from the error. In turn, the service endeavoured to identify error contributory 
factors from a systems perspective and implemented targeted strategies to address these.  
Safety culture and error reporting  
A notable finding in this study was palliative care clinicians overwhelmingly positive 
perceptions of the error reporting culture in their services. Error reporting is an essential 
component of patient safety which facilitates individual and organisational learning from 
error, and the development of error mitigating strategies (Institute of Medicine, 2000). Critical 
to effective error reporting is a non-punitive error reporting culture, where clinicians feel safe 
to report errors without fear of repercussion or disciplinary action (Institute of Medicine 
Committee on Quality of Health Care, 2001; World Health Organisation, 2005).  
Palliative care clinicians in this study strongly perceived that error reporting was encouraged 
and expected in their service, and stated they felt safe to do so. However, the non-punitive 
error reporting culture identified in this study differs from other studies in health care services 
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(Boyer, McPherson, Deshpande, & Smith, 2009; Castel, Ginsburg, Zaheer, & Tamim, 2015; 
Dincer, Torun, & Aksakal, 2018; Khalil & Lee, 2018). A Turkish study of palliative care 
nurses’ perceptions of safety culture found almost half (48%) reported that hospital 
management response to an error was punitive (Dincer et al., 2018). These nurses 
perceived that errors reflected an inability to carry out their professional role and thought 
they would be judged by their peers and punished by management (Dincer et al., 2018). 
Similarly, a  US study found palliative care nurses felt high levels of error reporting reflected 
negatively on their job performance, and error reporting was associated with subjective 
feelings of incompetence and guilt (Boyer et al., 2009). These starkly contrasting 
perceptions of error reporting culture in palliative care services may reflect the personal 
and/or professional drivers which are barriers to error reporting, or they may be attributable 
to differences in palliative care services’ investment in creating an overarching positive 
safety culture.  
In this study it was evident that a positive safety culture did not simply ‘happen’ in 
participating palliative care services. Rather, it required targeted and deliberate action, and 
took several years to establish (Institute of Medicine, 2000). Managers in this study, tasked 
with elevating the opioid safety culture within their service, spoke openly of the challenges in 
changing and re-building a culture of safety, and the importance of a non-punitive approach 
to errors when they occur. Factors such as complacency, entrenched clinical practice, 
leadership that did not prioritise patient safety, and/or a punitive error reporting culture, were 
some of the key obstacles that needed to be addressed in the creation of a positive safety 
culture. However, once established, the organisations’ safety culture influenced perceptions 
of: what clinicians came to consider as ‘normal’ safety behaviour (e.g., two nurses go to the 
bedside to administer an opioid), what motivated clinicians to engage in ‘safe’ behaviours 
(e.g., clinicians feeling empowered to follow opioid handling policy), and the translation of 
safe behaviours into routine clinical practice (e.g., palliative care nurses intercepting opioid 
prescribing errors) (Grissinger, 2014; Weaver et al., 2013). 
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Palliative care nurses error interception practices 
Palliative care nurses in this study were pivotal in identifying and intercepting opioid errors, 
particularly prescribing errors, before they reached the patient. Nurses’ capacity to intercept 
and rectify prescribing errors has been noted to commonly occur in other inpatient care 
settings (Cullen, Bates, & Leape; Flynn, Liang, Dickson, Xie, & Suh, 2012; Rothschild et al., 
2005). These actions may reflect nurses’ commitment to prioritising patients’ safety and 
comfort, and ensuring patient’s pain management is not adversely impacted due to error 
(Hewitt & Chreim, 2015; McBride-Henry & Foureur, 2006).  
One of the key facilitators of opioid error interception practices by palliative care nurses in 
this study was a supportive nursing practice environment. This was characterised by highly 
collaborative interdisciplinary relationships, supportive management, and organisational 
commitment to quality care (e.g., targeted opioid education and continuous quality 
improvement) (Aiken, Clarke, & Sloane, 2002; Flynn et al., 2012). Cohesive interdisciplinary 
teams are critical to patient safety in any healthcare setting (Committee on Quality Health 
Care in America, 2001; Firth-Cozens, 2001; Okuyama, Wagner, & Bijnen, 2014), and have 
been shown to increase the interception of medication errors in acute care (Flynn et al., 
2012). In a high functioning interdisciplinary team, trust between clinicians is high (Firth-
Cozens, 2001; Wittenberg-Lyles & Oliver, 2007). This was apparent for the palliative care 
clinicians in this study who pro-actively sought advice from one another if there was 
uncertainty about an opioid order, and were empowered to challenge and rectify opioid 
errors when they were identified (Firth-Cozens, 2001; Wittenberg-Lyles & Oliver, 2007).  
This level of collegial, interdisciplinary teamwork ultimately fosters the delivery of high 
quality, safe, patient care (Committee on Quality Health Care in America, 2001; 
Zwarenstein, Goldman, & Reeves, 2009), and was another key opioid error mitigating factor 




Mitigating errors through education 
The nature of opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services varies 
substantially from other healthcare settings (Heneka et al., 2019). Clinicians new to 
specialist palliative care inpatient services acknowledge the steep learning curve associated 
with opioid delivery in this setting, and experienced palliative care clinicians recognise the 
inherent risk of error with routine complex tasks such as opioid conversions (Heneka et al., 
2019). Hence, another facet of organisational support for opioid safety in this study was 
reflected in the in-depth opioid education provided at orientation to the service, and through 
ongoing formal and informal education opportunities for all disciplines.  
Clinicians in this study reported their confidence and ability to identify opioid errors stemmed 
largely from a solid opioid education, tailored to the specialist palliative care inpatient 
context. Notably, all palliative care services in this study employed a dedicated clinical nurse 
educator who was also pivotal in shaping, driving and reinforcing safe opioid delivery 
practices across the palliative care service. Additionally, palliative care pharmacists provided 
opioid specific education and ready support for any opioid related queries. Academic 
detailing (i.e., tailored clinical education provided peer-to-peer), is increasingly being used as 
a quality improvement tool, and is considered one of the most effective strategies to improve 
patient safety, particularly in conjunction with small group interactive education (Scott, 2009). 
Hence, the roles of the clinical nurse educator and pharmacist in the palliative care service 
are critical to supporting safe opioid delivery, which in turn, is essential to mitigating opioid 
errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services.  
Strengths and limitations 
A substantial number of palliative care clinicians from multiple disciplines participated in this 
study, enabling data saturation to be reached. This study has provided insights into opioid 
safety culture in specialist palliative care inpatient services, which has not been previously 
reported. Safety culture varies widely between and within organisations (Morello et al., 2013; 
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Pronovost & Sexton, 2005; Singer et al., 2003) hence, these findings may not be 
generalisable to other palliative care services/settings, or other healthcare services routinely 
handling high volumes of opioids. 
Implications for practice and research 
Assessing safety culture to identify areas of strength, and areas for improvement, is an 
essential first step for any specialist palliative care inpatient services considering strategies 
to improve the quality of care. Pro-actively embedding and sustaining a culture of opioid 
safety empowers specialist palliative care clinicians to practice safely. Exploring the inpatient 
palliative care setting to identify similarities and differences in safety culture across a greater 
number of services, including those in differing geographical regions is warranted. 
Conclusion 
Opioid safety is highly prioritised in specialist palliative care inpatient services. Creating a 
systems wide approach that supports palliative care clinicians to safely navigate the 
complexities of opioid delivery in the specialist palliative care inpatient service delivery 
context, and promotes a non-punitive approach to error occurrence and reporting, is 
essential to mitigating opioid errors in this care setting. Assessing safety culture within the 
specialist palliative care inpatient service to identify areas of strength and areas for 
improvement, is an essential first step for any palliative care services considering strategies 
to support and improve this aspect of care.  
The roles of the clinical nurse educator and pharmacist appear to be pivotal in instilling and 
supporting safe opioid delivery, and this warrants further investigation. Further exploration of 
safety culture in palliative care services is also warranted to identify the similarities and 
differences in culture across a greater number of palliative care service types (e.g., 
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Table: 1 Question guide for semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
• What are the strategies (current and/or previous) used in this unit to 
prevent/reduce opioid errors? 
• Is there anything else you think helps support safe opioid delivery in this 
unit? 
• Is there anything you think could be done in this service to better support 





Table 2: Summary of study themes 
Theme 1: A strong safety culture underpins safe opioid delivery  
i. Clear expectations regarding safe opioid delivery  
ii. Empowering clinicians to practise safely 
iii. Working as a team 
iv. Promoting a non-punitive approach to error 
Theme 2: Opioid error reporting is encouraged and expected  
i. Rectify or report? 
ii. Reflecting and learning from error 
Theme 3: Education is empowering  
Theme 4: Sustaining an opioid safety culture requires ongoing targeted 
attention 
 
 
